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liable in the sumofUS$5million and the Jones syndicate in the sumofUS$2.5million.This represented
a rateableproportion of two to one, so that theWellington syndicatebore two-thirds of the loss and
the Jones syndicate one-third. It followed that theWellington syndicate couldmaintain an action for
contribution for US$1,666,666.67. Again, unsurprisingly, this was the method the Wellington
syndicate argued for.
With regard to the other alternative, the `maximum liability' method, the contributions of the
insurers are proportionate to their maximum liabilities under the respective policies.On the facts
of the case this method did not produce any result different from that which would have been
derived from the application of the i`ndependent liability' approach, for the respective independent
liabilities of the insurers correspondedwith their maximum liabilities.This overlap between the two
methods will always be present in any case involving a loss which is equal to or in excess of the
maximum sums insured under the policies. But where the loss is otherwise the results may be
significantly different (see Commercial Union Assurance Co Ltd v Hayden [1977] QB 804).
In view of the fact that the i`ndependent liability' and m`aximum liability'methods produced the same
and, as far as the judgewas concerned, therightresult, the judgerefused to decidewhichmethodwas
applicable to the right to contribution in marine insurance law under section 80(1). In the judge's
opinion both were consistent with the language of section 80(1). How this unresolved question
might eventually be decided is far from easy to predict, for complex issues of insurance practice are
involved.There appears to emerge a general tendency in the sparse law that exists on the subject to
draw a distinction between property and liability insurance, and to adopt the `maximum liability'
method to the former and the i`ndependent liability' method to the latter. The reason for the
difference arises from the weight paid given to the sum insured when calculating the premium
payable in relation to property insurance.Taking this tendency as a guideline, it at least suggests an
argument for favouring the adoption of the `maximum liability' method in the case of hull and
machinery, and cargo insurance.
A postscript
The question of over-insurance by double insurance may be significantly influenced by agreements
between insurers and between insurers and assureds. Examples are provided by rateable
proportion clauses, disclosure obligations and exclusion clauses. Under a rateable proportion
clause, where there is over-insurance by double insurance, the insurer's obligation to indemnify is
limited to a rateable proportion of the damage suffered. The effect of the clause is to qualify the
right which an assured would otherwise possess to claim a full indemnity from the insurer, on the
assumption that the cover was adequate, thereafter leaving it to the insurer to claim contribution
from the co-insurer(s).
DRT
LETTER OF CREDIT ^ APPLICABLE LAW AND FORUM NON CONVENIENS
Marconi Communications International Ltd v PT Pan Indonesia Bank Ltd TBK
[2004] EWHC129, 4 February 2004
The facts
Marconi, an English company, claimed damages against Panin Bank, an Indonesian bank, for breach of
contract in respect of the latter's failure to honour its obligations as a confirmer of letter of credit.
The letter of credit was issued in respect of certain consignments of telephone equipment delivered
to an Indonesian company, PT Prismasentra Agung.The total contract price was $14,221,972.60.The
letter of creditwas issuedbyHastin Bank (also an Indonesianbank) and confirmedby Panin Bank.On
receiptof shippingdocuments,Panin Bankpassed themon toHastin BankbutHastin Bankrefused to
pay, relying on certain discrepancies.Panin Bank, in turn, refused to accept the draftswhich hadbeen
236 JIML10 [2004] 3 : ANALYSIS ANDCOMMENT
drawn upon it relying on the same discrepancies. It was acceptedby the court that the reasons given
by Hastin Bank were arguably unjustified. In themeantime,Hastin Bank had become insolvent.
Marconi claimed that Panin Bank had wrongfully failed to accept bills of exchange properly drawn
upon it and presented to it under the terms of the letter of credit. Marconi was granted leave to
serve the claim form out of jurisdiction on Panin Bank.
Panin Bank applied to set aside service and asked for a declaration that the English court had no
jurisdiction over Panin Bank. The issue was thus one of forum non conveniens, the Brussels
Regulation having no application as the defendant was domiciled in Indonesia, not in an EUMember
State.
The decision
The court had to be satisfied that at least one of the grounds listed in CPR r6.20 provided a good
arguable case for permission to serve out of the jurisdiction to be granted. Marconi asserted that
the contract between Panin Bank, as confirming bank, and Marconi, as beneficiary, wasmadewithin
the jurisdiction and that the contract was made by Standard and Chartered Bank (London) which
acted as Panin Bank's agent for the purpose of advising the confirmation to Marconi. It was also
submitted by Marconi that the letter of credit was governed by English law and the failure to honour
the credit constituted a breach within the jurisdiction. Panin Bank's response was that the letter of
credit was governed by Indonesian law.
An obvious starting point for the decisionwas whether the letter of credit was governed by English
law.David Steel J relied on the RomeConvention as contained in the Contracts (Applicable Law) Act
1990 and held that, on balance, the governing law of the credit was English law.Be that as itmay, the
court went on to hold that even if the credit was not governed by English law, there was a good
arguable case that the contract was made in the jurisdiction where the confirmation was conveyed
or that the contract was made by an agent trading or residing in the jurisdiction as Standard
Chartered Bank, at least under English law (BankMelli Iran v Barclays Bank [1951] 2 Lloyd's Rep 362),
mightbeproperlydeemed tobePaninBank's agent in advising the confirmation of the letter of credit.
The fourth ground relied on by Marconi in its application to serve outwas that the failure to pay out
under the letter of credit amounted to a breach occurring in the jurisdiction.The bank, on the other
hand, contended that the obligation to pay was on Panin Bank, which was resident in Indonesia and
the decision to refusepaymentwas taken in Indonesia.The judge, however, was unconvinced that this
necessarily meant that the breach had occurred in Indonesia.The judge opined that it was arguable
the bank was required to pay in London because either negotiation was to take place there or
payment was to be effected through Standard Chartered Bank as the collecting bank.Thus, there
was a good arguable case for service out on that ground.
The final issue for the court was whether it was permissible to execute alternative service on Panin
Bank's solicitors in London. The court concluded that although it was not impractical to serve on
Panin Bank in Indonesia, it would involve very extensive delay.Under Indonesian law, the procedure
for service could take at least one year during which time there was no prospect for the claimant
being able to enforce its claim against the defendant. Although there is authority from the Court of
Appeal in Knauf UKGmbH v British Gypsum Ltd [2002] 1WLR 907 that a mere desire for speed was
unlikely to amount to good reason justifying alternative service s`ince claimants nearly always desire
speed', that case concerned a claimant who was concerned to steal a march on the defendant by
trying to short-circuit the normal procedure under the Hague Convention in order to gain priority
under Article 21 (of the Brussels Convention) over the defendant.That was not the case here.
Comment
As far as the application of CPR r6.20 is concerned, this case does not offer much that is new but in
respect of the jurisprudence on the applicable or proper law of the letter of credit, David Steel J's
observations make for interesting analysis. In order to determine the applicable law of the credit, it
ANALYSIS ANDCOMMENT: JIML10 [2004] 3 237
is vital to refer to the Rome Convention.The Convention provides in general that the parties' choice
of law agreementwillbegiven effect to.However,most letters of creditdo notcontain a choice of law
clause. That absence means that the court should turn to the presumptions in Article 4 of the
Convention to ascertain the law of the country with the closest connectionwith the credit. Article
4 provides:
(2) Subject to the provisions of paragraph 5 of this Article, it shall be presumed that the contract is
most closely connected with the country where the party who is to effect the performance which is
characteristic of the contract has, at the time of the conclusion of the contract, his habitual residence,
or in the case of a body corporate or unincorporated, its central administration. However, if the
contract is entered into in the course of that party's trade or profession, that country shall be the
country in which the principal place of business is situated or, where under the terms of the contract
the performance is to be effected through a place of business other than the principal place of business,
the country inwhich that other place of business is situated.
(5) Paragraph 2 shall not apply if the characteristic performance cannot be determined, and the
presumptions in paragraphs 2,3 and 4 shall be disregarded if it appears from the circumstances as a
whole that the contract ismore closely connectedwith another country.
It was only natural for Panin Bank to argue that paragraph (2) applied squarely because the
characteristic performance was the payment on presentation of documents and as that was to be
carried by the bank, the country with the closest connection with the credit must be presumed to
be Indonesia where the bank is situated. The bank contended that there was nothing in the
circumstances whichwould suggest that the presumption in paragraph (2) should be disregarded.
The bank relied onMance J's judgment in Bankof Baroda vVysya Bank [1994] 2 Lloyd's Rep 87. Itmight
be recalled that in that case, the credit was issued by Vysya Bank, an Indian bank and confirmed by
Bank of Baroda's branch in London.Under Article 4(2), the applicable law of the contract between
the confirmingbank and thebeneficiary was English lawbecause the characteristic performancewas
the honouring of the letter of credit by the confirming bank's branch office and that branch was
situated in England.However, by applying Article 4(2) to the contract between the issuing bank and
thebeneficiary, that applicable law wouldbe Indian lawbecause theparty to effect the characteristic
performance, namely theprovision of the finance service,was the Indianbank.Mance J, however,was
concerned that would increase the conflicting decisions being given because there would be more
than one applicable law in the contractual matrix. His Lordship thus considered that Article 4(5)
should be applied to the relationship between the issuing bank and the beneficiary. As the issuing
bank's obligation is customarily the reimbursement of the confirming bank, the latter's relationship
with the beneficiary is pivotal.
In Bankof Baroda, the relationship in questionwas that between the issuing bank and the confirming
bank. Although in the present case, the relationship in question was that between the confirming
bank and the beneficiary, as Panin Bank rightly contended, the principle to be drawn from Bank of
Baroda was that the characteristic performance was the honouring of the letter of credit and that
was to be performed by Panin Bank. David Steel J, however, did not think that the analogy was
conclusive.His Lordship reasoned that Article 4(2) should in fact be derogated from because as the
credit was communicated to Marconi by an England-basedbank, Standard Chartered Bank, and that
StandardCharteredBankwas contemplated as one of several negotiatingbanks for the drafts drawn
under the letter of credit, England had the same closeness with the contract as Indonesia.The court
also added that even if StandardChartered Bankdidnotnegotiate the drafts drawnunder the credit,
it acted as collecting bank in checking and forwarding the documents.
A significant argumentraisedby Panin Bankwas that StandardCharteredBankwas not a confirming
bank, it was merely an advising bank with a relatively minor role in the letter of credit. It might not
even be a negotiating bank. In this connection, David Steel J turned to the pre-Convention case of
Offshore International SA v Banco Central SA [1977] 1WLR 399 for support. That case stated that it
would cause great inconvenience to apply the law of the issuing bank as the proper law where the
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actual payment obligation under the letter of credit was to be met by another bank in a different
jurisdiction. There, the letter of credit was issued by a Spanish bank and was advised, but not
confirmed, by a New York bank. Payment was to be made in US dollars against documents
presented in NewYork. Ackner J held:
. . . on the side of NewYork [law] are all matters of performance, whereas, in relation to Spanish law,
Spain and a Spanish bank was the source of the obligation. Inmy judgment, it is with NewYork law that
the transaction has its closest andmost real connection.Moreover. . . I am satisfied that . . . very great
inconvenience would arise, if the law of the issuing bank was to be considered the proper law. The
advising bank would have constantly to be seeking to apply awhole variety of foreign laws.
The reliance on this great inconvenience is used to support the argument that the fact that therewas
no confirmation by Standard Chartered Bank was immaterial. There is one important difference
between that and the present case.There, it was clearly expected that the NewYork bank was to
act also as the negotiating bank. It is less clear in the present case. Indeed, although Panin Bank had
authorized the drafts to be negotiated by any bank in England, the understanding was that Marconi
was to be paid directly by them. Payment was to be made by Panin Bank through the agency of its
correspondent bank in London. Should a distinction be made between payment to be effected
through a negotiating bank and direct payment through the international banking system? It seems
implicit from the present case that there was no distinction to be made on such lines as long as
paymentwas to be effected in England.Where that is the case, therewas a good arguable case that
English law is the applicable law of the credit.
As regards the emphasis on the great inconvenience to be caused by holding the law of the issuing
bank as the applicable law, two points may be made. First, it is not certain how relevant that
consideration is, given the terms of Article 4(2) of the Convention. Secondly, the inconvenience
should not be overstated.The rights and obligations of the parties in a letter of credit will to a large
extent be governed by the UCP 500 (and the ISBP 98 (International Standard Banking Practice)).
National courts are slow to depart from the Guidelines and Opinions of the ICC. Indeed, many
letter of credit disputes would have been referred to the ICC national committees for resolution.
The standardization of the rules and principles applicable to letters of credit should not make
matters too inconvenient even though a foreign law is applied.The problemwith the present case is
notoneprimarily in relation to the choice of law, but the choice of jurisdiction ^ Marconiwas keen to
bring the matter within English jurisdiction by tying the application to the issue of applicable law. It
might also be added that the fact that the letter of credit is governed by the law of the place where
payment ismade (as held in thepresentcase and Bankof Baroda) does notmean that contendingwith
foreign law is necessarily totally ameliorated.The drafts (bills of exchange)which thebanks negotiate
could very well be governed by a different applicable law depending onwhere it was drawn (section
72 Bills of Exchange Act 1882); although the problem is not likely to be significant because most of
such drafts will be drawn in England, that is not a foregone conclusion.
In Bankof Barodawhichwas followed in the present case, the judicial attitude to Article 4(5) is that it
holds equal, if not stronger, forcewith Article 4(2).Under Article 4(5), the court has the discretion to
disregard the presumption in Article 4(2). Cheshire and North (13th ed, p 574) refers to Socie¨te¨
Nouvelle des Papeteries de l'Aa v Machinefabriek (BOA 25 September, NJ (1992) No750, RvD (1992)
No 207) a Dutch decision to show the difference in attitude between the English and Dutch courts.
In the Dutch case, the Dutch Supreme Court refused to apply Article 4(5) to rebut the presumption
that Dutch law applied, even though the only connection with the Netherlands was that it was the
place ofbusiness of thepersonwhoseperformancewas characteristic of the contract,whereasmany
elements of the case linked the contract to France, including the vital fact that performance of the
contract (by that person) took place there.Cheshire and North said:
. . . perhaps more worrying is the underlying difference in attitude in England and the Netherlands
towards the whole question of rebuttal of the presumption. The English attitude is that Article 4(5)
formally makes the presumption very weak and the presumption is displaced if the court considers
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that it is not appropriate to apply in the circumstances of any given case . . . In contrast, the Dutch
attitude is that the presumption is of great weight and should only be rebutted in exceptional cases,
that Article 4(2) is the main rule . . . and that the law identified by the presumption prevails unless it
has no real significance as a connecting factor.
The present case reaffirms that English attitude. It would be useful for the ECJ to offer guidance on
how the presumptions should be applied.
JC
SHIP SALE AND PURCHASE ^ NEGOTIATIONS ^ BROKERS ^ RECAP MESSAGE ^
SUBJECT TO DETAILS ^ WHETHER BINDING CONTRACT MADE
Thoreson & Co (Bangkok) Ltd v Fathom Marine Company Ltd, Brazilian Hope Shipping
Co Ltd and Yale Shipping Co Ltd
[2004] EWHC167(Comm); [2004] 1Lloyd's Rep 622
Facts
The claimants negotiated the purchase of three ships, one each from three subsidiary companies of
Elfshipping Company SA. The negotiations were conducted through brokers based in Oslo and
Piraeus. After an inspection and various offers and counter-offers the parties agreed on a price of
US$42million less 1 per cent commission. Agreement on price and terms was settled by telephone
and email. The buyer's broker then sent a recap email, a long message which purported to set out
the conclusions arrived at with regard to the various matters negotiated by the parties.One clause
in the recap provided:
Otherwise basis Saleform 93 sub details suitably amended to reflect also the above terms.Closing to
take place in Piraeus.
The seller's brokers respondedby correcting twomatters in the recapmessagebut otherwise saying
that it was in order.
The subsequent preparation and agreement to the MOAs was very slow, ostensibly because the
buyer's brokers were encountering difficulties obtaining instructions from their principal. Eventually
the seller's brokers sent a formal email to the buyer's brokers which stated:
all other eventual subjects referred on the Recap are lifted and the only point to agree is thewording of
the MOAs.Therefore please receive for buyers the amendments required by sellers on the above said
draft MOAwith Rider clauses, as below stated, which are firm for reply latest by1700hrs Greek time
today.
The buyers failed to respond within the time stipulated whereupon the seller's brokers sent a
message to the buyer's brokers,`Under the above the negotiations are considered to have failed'.
Issues
The issues between the parties concernedwhether a binding contract to sell andbuy the vessels had
been made.The buyers argued that a contract had been arrived at in the email messages and recap
messages which had passed between the brokers. And that the contract was on the terms of the
Norwegian Saleform 1993, subject to suitable amendments to reflect the specific terms agreed
between the buyers and sellers, as set out in the recapmessage.Consequently the email sent by the
seller's brokers indicating that negotiations had failed amounted to a repudiation of the contract.
The sellers relied on thewords s`ub details' in a clause in the recap email.The sellers argued that the
words meant s`ubject to details' and that it was established a`s a matter of law and/or custom' that
these words had the effect of requiring the details of the contract to be agreed before a binding
contract was established.
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